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Mapping the Rule of Law for the Internet 
Andrew D. Murray 
Abstract 
Since its inception as a standalone topic of scholarship in the 1990s, the study of 
cyberlaw has been a study in regulatory theory. We have discussed systems of 
regulation and tools of regulatory enforcement. We have divided researchers 
into groups labelled as ‘techno-deterministic’ and ‘libertarian/communitarian’ 
and we have discussed regulatory effectiveness and legitimacy. The missing 
element of much cyberlaw study has been the law element. We have focused too 
extensively on the cyber and too little on the law. This chapter seeks to rebalance 
and refocus cyberlaw on the key element, the jurisprudential structure of 
cyberlaw, in particular to examine the question of the rule of law (or its absence) 
in cyberspace. In so doing it seeks to form the foundations of a cyberlaw 
jurisprudence by asking some difficult normative questions: Can a rule of law 
exist online? If so who is the legitimate lawmaker and what values are enshrined 
by cyberlaw? 
 
Cyberlaw and Cyber-regulatory Theory 
The title of this chapter may seem a little out of context for a book mapping the 
legal challenges of social media but hopefully over the course of the next few 
pages I can convince the reader of its utility and role in the wider context of the 
book as a whole. The challenge of social media regulation is a microcosm of the 
challenges of legal regulation of the internet as a whole, and lessons learned in 
the wider context can be applied in the narrower, and vice versa. Thus as one’s 
eyes are drawn down the list of chapters to be found in the book one sees clearly 
how the two are linked. Jacob Rowbottom’s chapter on crime, communication 
and free expression is a chapter which can look inwardly at the regulation of 
social media platforms or outwardly at the normative question of values, culture 
and society in the global network context. The same is true of almost any chapter 
selected at random from the index such as Francois du Bois’ chapter on 
reputation and dignity and Daithí Mac Síthigh’s chapter on contempt. The macro 
becomes the micro and the micro the macro. It has become commonplace for the 
academic cyberlaw commentator to study the detail through micro-level analysis 
of a specific topic or challenge.1 Arguably this represents a maturity of the 
subject. Just as the study of law involves the study of the application of 
developments and aspects of the law through specialist subjects of study: 
contract, torts, family law, corporate and commercial law, medical law and public 
law; the study of cyberlaw through the specialist aspects of cyberlaw: digital 
privacy and data protection law, protection of children, cybercrime, digital 
expression, and speech and jurisdiction, reflects the acceptance of cyberlaw as a 
distinct discipline of study within the wider field of legal study. This is despite 
the best efforts of early deniers such as Frank Easterbrook2 and Joseph Sommer.3  
                                                        
1 The list of such analyses is long and would include for example classic papers such as DR 
Sheridan’s ‘Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon 
Liability for Defamation on the Internet’ (1997-1998) 61 Alb L Rev 147 and Jacob Rowbottom’s 
‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech’ (2012) 71 CLJ 355 in the fields of 
defamation, speech and chilling effects, and Orin Kerr’s ‘Internet Surveillance Law after the USA 
Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn't’ (2003) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 607 or 
Daniel Solove’s ‘Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy’ (2002) 75 
Southern California Law Review 1084 in digital privacy law. 
2 Frank H Easterbrook, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’ (1996) University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 207. 
3 Joseph H. Sommer, ‘Against Cyberlaw’ (2000) 15 Berkeley Tech LJ 1145.  
 
 Arguably though what is missing from this contextual analysis of law in 
action in the cyberspace environment is the contribution of a jurisprudential 
analysis. Traditional legal analysis has the luxury of referring back to a rich 
jurisprudential framework and whereas cyberlaw, as the study of the application 
of legal normative principles in cyberspace, has access to that rich framework, 
we, that is scholars of cyberlaw, have as yet failed to make much in the way of 
meaningful contribution to the wider body of jurisprudence. That is not to say 
the contribution is not there. There is Chris Reed’s excellent book Making Laws 
for Cyberspace,4 and unique contributions from cyberlaw experts can be found in 
fields such as (digital) privacy rights5 and digital expression.6 However these 
contributions are uncommon, more commonly it is the micro analysis rather 
than the macro analysis that the academic cyberlawer engages in.  
 
This is to be expected, it reflects the day-to-day work of the academic lawyer in 
2016. We are detail oriented in a way a practicing lawyer cannot always be due 
to the pressure of work. The space afforded to the academic lawyer to look in 
detail at an application of the law to a specific cyberspace challenge has allowed 
for the production of a number of excellent books and papers in the last five 
years by academic cyberlawyers working in the UK.7 The UK legal academic 
                                                        
4 OUP, 2012.  
5 E.g. Julie Cohen, ‘What Privacy is For’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1904; Daniel J Solove, 
‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1880.  
6 E.g. Jack M Balkin, ‘Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society’ (2004) 79 NYU Law Review 1; Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 
(Princeton University Press, 2007).  
7 E.g. Emily B. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and 
Corporate Responsibility (CUP 2015); Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect 
Autonomy (CUP 2014); Jacob Rowbottom, 'In the Shadow of Big Media: Freedom of Expression, 
Participation and the Production of Knowledge Online' [2014] Public Law 491; Daithí Mac 
Síthigh, ‘Virtual walls? The law of pseudo-public spaces’ (2012) 8 International Journal of Law in 
community is at the forefront of the analysis of the legal risks and responses to 
new media, especially social media, as this collection demonstrates. However the 
development of a distinct cyberspace jurisprudence remains stunted. Where we 
discuss theoretical aspects of cyberlaw (outwith the application of traditional 
jurisprudential theories to specific cyberlaw case studies) we tend to stray from 
the law to the wider fields of regulation and governance theory.  
 
This can be tracked to the rise of the cyberpaternalist movement in the late 
1990s, first seen in Joel Reidenberg’s conceptualization of Lex Informatica.8 In 
setting out his new model, Reidenberg identified two novel regulatory modalities 
arising from new rule-making processes for the online environment. The first 
consisted of the contractual agreements among Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
and between ISPs and their customers. The second was to be found in the 
network architecture. Reidenberg argued, with some degree of success, that 
technical standards could function in a regulatory capacity. Using the network 
architecture as a proxy for regulatory architecture Reidenberg suggested a new 
way of looking at control and regulation in the online environment, a 
conceptualization he called Lex Informatica. Drawing upon the principle of Lex 
Mercatoria and referring to the ‘laws’ imposed on network users by 
technological capabilities and system design choices, Reidenberg asserted that 
whereas political governance processes usually establish the substantive laws of 
nation states, in Lex Informatica the primary sources of default rule-making are 
                                                        
Context 394; Ian Brown, ‘Keeping Our Secrets? Designing Internet Technologies for the Public 
Good’ (2014) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 368.   
8 Joel Reidenberg, ‘Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace’ (1996) 45 Emory Law 
Journal 911; Joel Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology’ (1998) 76 Texas Law Review 553.  
the technology developer(s) and the social processes through which customary 
uses of the technology evolve. To this end, he argued that the internet is closely 
regulated by its architecture. 
 
Reidenberg contended that in the light of Lex Informatica’s dependence on 
design choices the attributes of public oversight associated with regulatory 
regimes could be maintained by shifting the focus of government actions away 
from direct regulation of cyberspace, toward influencing changes to its 
architecture. Reidenberg’s concept of regulatory control implemented through 
the control mechanisms already in place in the network architecture led to 
development of the new cyberpaternalist school. This new school viewed legal 
controls as merely part of the network of effective regulatory controls in the 
online environment and suggested that lawmakers seeking to control the online 
activities of their citizens would seek to control these activities indirectly by 
mandating changes to the network architecture, or by supporting self-regulatory 
activities of network designers. This idea was most fully developed and 
explained by Professor Lawrence Lessig in his classic text Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace.9  As the title reveals Lessig was influenced by Reidenberg’s Lex 
Informatica10 into developing his ‘code is law’ thesis. This posits that while there 
are four modalities of regulation: law, norms, markets and architecture, in 
cyberspace the regulatory effectiveness of three of these, law, norms and 
                                                        
9 Basic Books, 1999. 
10 In truth Lessig had been working on a similar idea himself and indeed he and Reidenberg had 
been corresponding about their ideas as they developed them independently of each other. 
Earlier iterations of Lessig’s ‘Code’ argument may be seen in Lawrence Lessig, ‘The New Chicago 
School’ (1998) 27 The Journal of Legal Studies 661 and Lawrence Lessig, ‘The Law of the Horse: 
What Cyberlaw Might Teach’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review 501.  
markets are reduced due to the nature of the space.11 One modality though, as 
Reidenberg had predicted, is strengthened in the digital environment: the 
modality of architecture, or to use the label given to it by Lessig in relation to the 
digital environment ‘code’.  
 
Lessig’s ‘code is law’, perhaps more correctly ‘code as law’, thesis quickly became 
the focal point of cyber-governance and cyber-regulatory discourse.12 The 
discussion quickly recentred from the vibrant debate on the legitimacy of legal 
controls in cyberspace, which had been active prior to the publication of 
Reidenberg’s and Lessig’s works,13 to a wider engagement on the role of 
regulatory modalities, and in particular the role played by code.14   This arguably 
was the right direction for the academic discourse to move to at that time. It 
                                                        
11 Due to effects such as remoteness, geographical limitations, anonymity and pseudonymity. 
12 The distinction between regulation and governance is one which has proven perennially 
difficult for regulatory theorists. Here the distinction applied is that regulation is ‘the intentional 
use of authority to affect behaviour of a different party according to set standards, involving 
instruments of information-gathering and behaviour modification.’ (Julia Black, ‘Decentring 
Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” 
World’, (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103). Governance is a broader term than regulation. 
While the term governance has been given a wide range of meanings from varied literatures in 
the social sciences (see Kees Van Kersbergen & Frans Van Waarden, ‘“Governance” as a bridge 
between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems 
of governability, accountability and legitimacy (2004) 43 European Journal of Political Research 
143) governance is understood (alongside government) as concerned with the provision and 
distribution of goods and services, as well as their regulation. Hence regulation is conceived as 
that large subset of governance that is primarily concerned with the purposive steering of the 
flow of events and behaviour, as opposed to providing and distributing (see John Braithwaite, 
David Levi-Faur & Cary Coglianese, ‘Can regulation and governance make a difference?’, (2007) 1 
Regulation & Governance 1).  
13 David R Johnson & David G Post, ‘Law And Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 
Stanford Law Review 1367; Jane C Ginsburg, ‘Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private International 
Law questions of the Global Information Infrastructure’ (1995) 42 Journal of the Copyright 
Society of the USA. 318; Jack L Goldsmith, ‘Against Cyberanarchy’ (1998) 65 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 1199; Christopher M Kelly, ‘The Cyberspace Separatism Fallacy’ (1999) 34 
Texas International Law Journal 413. 
14 Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (OUP 
2006); Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet: And How to Stop it (OUP 2008); Andrew 
Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment (Routledge 2006); Ian 
Brown & Christopher T Marsden, Regulating Code: Good Governance and Better Regulation in the 
Information Age (MIT Press 2013); Roger Brownsword, ‘Code, Control, and Choice: why East is 
East and West is West’ (2005) Legal Studies 1.  
seemed that regulation was the key question for lawmakers and for the users of 
internet services. Early attempts at direct legal control, such as legal controls 
over Digital Rights Management (DRM) software found in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act15 in the US and the Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society Directive in the EU16 had failed in their effectiveness, as had 
early content laws such as the Communications Decency Act.17  It seemed that 
code controls such as AOL’s strictly regulated online walled gardens were more 
likely to be effective.18  In short Lessig’s refocusing of the debate from questions 
of the legitimacy of legal controls in cyberspace to questions of the role and 
legitimacy of private regulators and the interface between East Coast Code (or 
law) and West Coast Code (or digital network and applications code) was 
important and timely. However arguably we, that is academic cyberlawyers, 
have remained entrenched in this analysis for too long. I count myself among the 
worst offenders having spent the bulk of the last fifteen years examining Lessig’s 
models, but I am not the only offender. As the internet has matured it has 
evolved from a disruptive space into an established space. We see this in almost 
all aspects of the internet and its use today.  The explosive development of 
disruptive e-business models so prevalent in the .com boom of the late 1990s has 
been displaced by a settled business environment with a relatively small number 
of key e-commerce providers (Amazon, Alibaba, JD, Ebay etc), the explosive 
growth of social media in the 2000s has settled into a few providers (Facebook, 
Twitter, Weibo, LinkedIn, tumblr) and the vast explosion in blogs and news 
                                                        
15 Pub. L. 105–304.  
16 Dir. 2001/29/EC. 
17 Pub. L. 104-104. 
18 Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 (Basic Books 2005) 88-94. 
networks has mostly seen the accretion of a large number of personal blogs into 
more widespread and popular collective blogs. In essence the Internet has 
become less fractured and less chaotic as it has become more commercialized 
and commoditized. Counterintuitively this makes code less important and laws 
more important.  As the network becomes what one may call a civilized space 
governments have become happier and more used to the idea of direct 
regulation through law, and as the parties providing the platform for activity are 
in many cases multi-million dollar, or even multi-billion dollar international 
corporations, they are used to legal controls and on the whole have been happy 
to help governments enforce legal controls.  Thus recently we have seen a raft of 
legislative measures designed to legally control online activity. These include 
amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 to regulate (distributed) denial of 
service attacks19 and network attacks;20 the introduction of specific legal 
controls on involuntary pornography;21 and the promulgation of new provisions, 
and specific defences, in relation to online defamation.22 In addition the courts 
have been busy and cases such as Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González23 and 
Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner24 demonstrate a new form 
of judicial activism in dealing with online activity through the application of 
existing laws.  
 
                                                        
19 As made by the Police and Justice Act 2006. 
20 As made by the Serious Crime Act 2015. 
21 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s33. 
22 Defamation Act 2013, s5. 
23 Case C-131/12 (2014). 
24 Case C-362/14 (2015). 
There remains, though an elephant in the room, an assumption or supposition 
which we all make and which I ask the reader to consider. Are these legal orders, 
settlements and judgements, which we discuss in the assumption that they carry 
the full force of law, legitimate?  We assume the legitimacy of the Defamation Act 
2013, as applied specifically to online content, as it is an Act of the UK 
Parliament. This is not an unfair assumption but it is an assumption borne of the 
physical rather than digital world. The UK Parliament draws authority to 
regulate and control our acts from a number of sources depending on your 
flavour of legal positivism. If you are Austinian, something of a rarity these days, 
you point to the fact that Parliament is Sovereign (as the Queen in Parliament) 
and its acts are therefore laws.25 If you are a Hartian, more likely today, you will 
apply the rule of recognition and find that the relevant officials such as Judges 
will recognize the Act as law, as will citizens.26 You may not define yourself as a 
legal positivist – perhaps you prefer the interpretive approach of Ronald 
Dworkin, among others, and you may trust in Judge Hercules to interpret the 
body of law in such a way as to recognize the Act and apply its principles.27 There 
are alternates to these competing tenets of law – there remains the vestiges of 
natural law found today in Fuller’s Morality of Law,28 the distinction between 
this and legal positivism being found, in Niki Lacey’s words in ‘the clear 
separation between our understanding of how to determine what the law is and 
                                                        
25 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence: Or the Philosophy of Positive Law, (1869, Reprint 
Forgotten Books 2015). 
26 HLA. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 1961). 
27 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977), Ronald Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). 
28 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1964).  
our criticisms or vision of what it ought to be’.29 Then there is Polycentric Law 
perhaps for our purposes the most sophisticated modern jurisprudence the 
acceptance of private ordering (such as ADR) and the recognition of multiple 
overlapping sovereignties.30 It is the one philosophical foundation of law which 
specifically acknowledges the internet.31  At each turn though however you 
define your jurisprudential footing we are discussing a philosophy of legal order 
defined by reference to the “old world”: the world of atoms, borders, sovereigns 
and lawmakers. Not the new world: the world of bits, pipes, networks and 
platforms.  By turns we find ourselves, some twenty years on from the famous 
Chicago conference of 1996, returning to the questions that were active then. In 
the face of increasing legal interventions into online activity by both 
governments and judges: can a rule of law exist online? And if so who is the 
legitimate lawmaker and what values are enshrined by cyberlaws and 
cyberlawmaking? 
Rule of Law 
The astute reader may now suppose that I risk pursuing the wrong line of enquiry: 
to use a valuable analogy there is a risk going off down the wrong rabbit hole. They 
may say I am heading off down the rabbit hole called what is law? Or perhaps how 
does one define and recognize law, in other words the rabbit hole marked 
jurisprudence when you should be heading off down the rabbit hole entitled what 
is the rule of law – in other words following Dicey rather than Hart or Dworkin. 
                                                        
29 Nicola Lacey, ‘H.L.A. Hart’s rule of law: the limits of philosophy in historical perspective’ (2007) 
36 Quaderni Fiorentini, 1203. 
30 Tom W Bell, ‘Polycentric Law’ (1991/92) 7(1) Institute for Humane Studies Review; Gerard 
Casey, ‘Reflections on Legal Polycentrism’ (2010) 22 Journal of Libertarian Studies 22.  
31 Casey ibid.  
Except I think that as with so many things when we venture outwith the world of 
atoms and into the world of bits both rabbit holes lead us to the same Wonderland. 
So in the remainder of this chapter I’m going to follow both paths and see if we 
emerge into the same place – in so doing I’m hoping to begin by sketching out a 
map of where we may find a rule of law for cyberspace.  
 
First I have a difficult definitional problem – No one seems to agree on what the 
rule of law actually is. Let's start with the formal or thin definition: ‘At its core the 
rule of law, requires that government officials and citizens are bound by and act 
consistent with the law. This basic requirement entails a set of minimal 
characteristics: law must be set forth in advance (be prospective), be made public, 
be general, be clear, be stable and certain, and be applied to everyone according 
to its terms. In the absence of these characteristics, the rule of law cannot be 
satisfied.’32 To this we may add thickness through concepts such as TRS Allan’s 
principles of institutional fairness – ‘ideas about individual liberty and natural 
justice, and, more generally, ideas about the requirements of justice and fairness 
in the relations between government and governed’33 or thicker still through the 
incorporation of formal legality, individual rights, democracy, and a further 
qualitative dimension that might be roughly categorized under the label ‘social 
welfare rights.’34 We are in danger though as we thicken out understanding of the 
rule of law to depart from the core legal message an examination of society and 
inequality. I do not believe this is a role of the rule of law and more to the point 
                                                        
32 Brian Z Tamanaha, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’ in Gianluggi Palombella & Neil Walker, 
Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart 2008), 3. 
33 TRS Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism 
(Clarendon 1993) 21.   
34 Brian Z Tamanaha, ‘The Rule of Law for Everyone?’ (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 97.  
this is not necessary or relevant for my argument. I am going to remain wedded to 
the thin definition throughout the remainder of this chapter not because I 
necessarily believe it is the best definition (I actually like the thicker definition) 
but because it is the minimal definition and if I can demonstrate a failure in the 
rule of law at its thinnest the findings therein may be applied equally to thicker 
definitions.  
 
Do we find the thin definition rule of law in the Internet? The answer I believe is 
no and I believe I can demonstrate this on both a theoretical and empirical level. 
To begin with the theoretical: We must start by defining our space and our 
participants. This was the root of that now long forgotten debate in the 1990s 
between libertarians and Berkman School paternalists.35 As we may remember 
David Johnson and David Post argued that the Internet was not susceptible to legal 
control due to the lack of physical borders online and limits in territorial 
legitimacy: 
The determined seeker of prohibited communications can simply 
reconfigure his connection so as to appear to reside in a different 
location, outside the particular locality, state, or country. Because the Net 
is engineered to work on the basis of “logical,” not geographical, 
locations, any attempt to defeat the independence of messages from 
physical locations would be as futile as an effort to tie an atom and a bit 
together. And, moreover, assertions of law-making authority over Net 
activities on the ground that those activities constitute “entry into” the 
                                                        
35 See n 13 above.   
physical jurisdiction can just as easily be made by any territorially based 
authority. If Minnesota law applies to gambling operations conducted on 
the World Wide Web because such operations foreseeably affect 
Minnesota residents, so, too, must the law of any physical jurisdiction 
from which those operations can be accessed. By asserting a right to 
regulate whatever its citizens may access on the Net, these local 
authorities are laying the predicate for an argument that Singapore or 
Iraq or any other sovereign can regulate the activities of U.S. companies 
operating in cyberspace from a location physically within the United 
States. All such Web-based activity, in this view, must be subject 
simultaneously to the laws of all territorial sovereigns. 
 
Nor are the effects of online activities tied to geographically proximate 
locations. Information available on the World Wide Web is available 
simultaneously to anyone with a connection to the global network. The 
notion that the effects of an activity taking place on that Web site radiate 
from a physical location over a geographic map in concentric circles of 
decreasing intensity, however sensible that may be in the nonvirtual 
world, is incoherent when applied to Cyberspace. A Web site physically 
located in Brazil, to continue with that example, has no more of an effect 
on individuals in Brazil than does a Web site physically located in 
Belgium or Belize that is accessible in Brazil. Usenet discussion groups, 
to take another example, consist of continuously changing collections of 
messages that are routed from one network to another, with no 
centralized location at all; they exist, in effect, everywhere, nowhere in 
particular, and only on the Net. 
 
Territorial regulation of online activities serves neither the legitimacy 
nor the notice justifications. There is no geographically localized set of 
constituents with a stronger and more legitimate claim to regulate it than 
any other local group. The strongest claim to control comes from the 
participants themselves, and they could be anywhere.36  
 
The paternalist response demonstrated the ability of regulators (lawmakers if you 
will) to leverage effective control.37 Lessig’s code argument remains a tour-de-
force and illustrates that taking an external perspective, as outlined by Orin Kerr, 
allows us to treat the Internet like any other communications network: in Kerr’s 
words ‘the Internet is simply a network of computers located around the world 
and connected by wires and cables’.38  Taking this approach Lessig and others 
demonstrated that Johnson and Post’s argument was a simple enforcement 
argument not a normative one and it seems the entire debate moved on. From the 
point of the publication of Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace in 1999 the debate 
has been about accountability of regulators and legitimacy of the rule-making 
process, but there remained a part of the original Johnson and Post argument 
which was never fully answered by the external, paternalist, analysis. In his paper 
What Larry Doesn’t Get, David Post argued that we should not be convinced by 
                                                        
36 Johnson and Post, above n 13 at 1374-1375. 
37 See e.g. Reidenberg, above n 8 and Lessig, above n 9. 
38 Orin S. Kerr, ‘The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law’ (2003) 91 The Georgetown Law 
Journal 357 360. 
Lessig’s argument that without collective action the invisible hand of commerce 
will regulate.39 In a section entitled ‘the ought of it’ he discussed the legitimacy of 
intervention into an organic community on the pretence of staving off the invisible 
hand. Here he returned to the earlier point made by himself and David Johnson – 
just because a government can regulate does not mean that they ought to regulate. 
If by making an intervention they act in an illegitimate manner they ought not to 
intervene. This is a basic tenet one may say of the most basic principle of the rule 
of law: government officials and citizens are bound by and act consistent with the 
law. An illegitimate act (assuming it is legally or procedurally inconstant not just 
morally inconsistent) is therefore a breach of the thin principle.  
 
What Post and Johnson pointed out was that the acts of traditional state-based 
lawmakers will exceed their authority due to the borderless nature of the 
network. A decision by say a court in Sweden to close down The Pirate Bay affects 
not only citizens who are subject of the jurisdiction of that court but also citizens 
globally.40 Thus if I am a UK based musician who distributes my content via The 
Pirate Bay, the decision of the Swedish court to close down the site affects me 
directly even though I am not subject to that jurisdiction or court. Similarly if say 
an English court orders that the identity of a philandering footballer must not be 
revealed and orders that a website upon which this may be found remove the 
                                                        
39 David Post, ‘What Larry Doesn’t Get: A Libertarian Response to Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1439. 
40 Sweden v Neij et al. Case B 13301-06, Tingsrätt, Stockholm, 17 April 2009. 
offending content or face an action in contempt this will affect individuals in Italy, 
Canada or even Scotland.41  
 
Now you may say that the effects of the Swedish or English court decision are not 
strongly felt, the network will route itself around the legal intervention as if it 
were damage and everything will continue on as it were, UK citizens will still 
access The Pirate Bay and Scottish citizens will call the philandering footballer 
Ryan Giggs. This though is to miss the point that the act produced illegitimate, 
extra jurisdictional, effects: it was not in compliance with the rule of law. This 
though is only the start of our journey, for the response of the lawmaker faced 
with failure of their legal intervention is to create further and more restrictive 
legal interventions. We find that as a citizen subject to the courts of England and 
Wales offline we become subject to multiple overlapping legal controls online. 
Actions we complete, from Kerr’s external viewpoint, in the comfort of our own 
homes may from the internal viewpoint be viewed as occurring elsewhere. 
Extradition for acts committed externally in the UK become possible from the 
internal viewpoint. This you may say is fanciful but let’s look at a few individuals 
who have been caught up in this. In 2013 Yasir Afsar, a British Citizen, was subject 
to an extradition request from the United Arab Emirates.42 He had threatened to 
place naked images of his ex-wife online unless she gave him money following 
their separation. He then allegedly sent a naked photograph of his ex-wife via 
                                                        
41 The second example draws inspiration from the case of CTB v News Group 
Newspapers Limited [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB) and in particular the application 
CTB v Twitter, Inc. and Persons Unknown (Case No. HQ11XO1814) which was 
withdrawn by the claimant.  
42 The Government of the United Arab Emirates v Yasir Afsar, Unrpt, Westminster Magistrates 
Court, 15 August 2013. Transcript available from: 
http://www.kaimtodner.com/news/2013/08/16/yasir_afsar_judgement.asp.   
email to a common acquaintance. Although this may legally be blackmail in the UK 
he was not investigated or charged in the UK, instead the UAE government sought 
to extradite him for breach of UAE Federal Law No. 2 of 2006 on the prevention of 
Information Technology Crimes, Article 16 which provides: ‘Whoever violates any 
of the family principles or values, published news or pictures violating the privacy 
of the private or family lives -even if true- through the information network or any 
other means of information technology shall be sentenced to imprisonment to a 
period of one year at least and a fine amounting to AED 50,000 at least, or to other 
penalties.’ The maximum sentence set out in the Extradition Request was five 
years imprisonment. In the event the extradition was not allowed, not because 
there is no corresponding criminal provision in UK Law (or at least there was not 
at that time, one may argue whether s.33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 
2015 would be a corresponding provision) but because he was ‘likely to be denied 
a fair trial’ and would ‘suffer prejudice because of his ethnicity’.43 A not dissimilar 
case is that of Sheffield student Richard O’Dwyer. In 2012 he was the subject of an 
extradition request from the United States with regard to the operation of the 
TVShack website. The extradition request followed a decision of the Southern 
District Court in New York to bring two charges against him for criminal copyright 
infringement.44 The two charges, conspiracy to commit copyright infringement 
and criminal infringement of copyright, each carried a potential maximum 
sentence of five years in prison. It is arguable that O’Dwyer’s actions in operating 
a so-called linking website, that is one which does not host infringing materials 
but which links to where they may be found, was in accordance with UK Law as it 
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was understood at the time. He may have been in breach of s.107(2A) CDPA but 
the application of the admittedly non-binding Crown Court Oinks Pink Palace45 
and TV Links46 cases, as well as the guidance on linking in Shetland Times v Wills,47 
suggested his actions were at least arguably legal in the UK. In January 2012 
District Judge Quentin Purdey ordered O’Dwyer’s extradition to the United States. 
He is reported to have said: ‘there are said to be direct consequences of criminal 
activity by Richard O'Dwyer in the USA, albeit by him never leaving the north of 
England. Such a state of affairs does not demand a trial here if the competent UK 
authorities decline to act, and does, in my judgment, permit one in the USA.’48 The 
extradition order was approved by UK Home Secretary Theresa May in March, 
2012, and O'Dwyer launched an appeal. Then in November 2012, it was 
announced that O'Dwyer had signed a deferred prosecution agreement to avoid 
extradition. He was ordered to pay a fine of £20,000 and remain in contact with a 
US correctional officer over the next six months. In return, the United States would 
drop all charges.49 Ultimately therefore O’Dwyer never stood trial in the United 
States for actions he committed, in the internal perspective in England, and strictly 
applying the external perspective in the Netherlands as that is where his content 
was hosted. The United States claimed jurisdiction solely on the basis that he used 
a .net domain name and which they claimed gave them the right to assert US laws 
globally, because American companies such as Verisign manage these domains. 
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This was enough it seemed to force O’Dwyer to submit to US Federal Law and to 
force him to enter a plea agreement which saw him forced to close a website that 
at the very least was in a legal grey area in the UK, submit to a fine of £20,000 and 
agree to six months probationary supervision.  
 
This is potentially the tip of a very large iceberg. Are you certain nothing you have 
ever said online has breached s.204 of Nigeria’s Criminal Code? 50  What about 
s.133 of the Thai Criminal Code?51 What does this mean for the rule of law? Let’s 
return to our principles. The first principle is that law must be set forth in advance 
(be prospective). This will usually be the case whatever law is being applied and 
from whichever part of the world so this would appear to be satisfied. The second 
principle is that the law be made public. This is not quite so simple. While many 
laws from around the world are made available online not all are and where they 
are available many are not available in translation. This is a challenge for the rule 
of law if we accept the principle of extra-territorial effect (as I am arguing). The 
third principle is that the law be general.  This would appear to be satisfied, 
although I don’t know all laws in all jurisdictions which I may be made subject to. 
The fourth principle is that the law must be clear. Again there are some problems 
with this. Language aside there may be cultural references or procedural ones, 
which are unclear. Even something simple such as do not distribute indecent 
images of a child require one to know the age of majority. The fifth principle is that 
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the law must be stable and certain. It is clearly the case that individually each state 
may have stable laws in terms of the rule of law but collectively the law is 
inherently unstable and uncertain given the high level of ‘churn’ across all 
jurisdictions. For example in December 2013 I asked a room full of British experts 
on internet law whether the French HADOPI law 52  was still in force. The 
overwhelming majority of those present were unaware that the French 
Government had revoked it on 8 July 2013 because the penalties contained therein 
were considered to be disproportionate. The final principle is that the law be 
applied to everyone according to its terms. This appears to be satisfied but this 
may in fact be the problem. Individually each jurisdiction may comply with the 
thin definition of the rule of law but when we get extra-territorial impact, as we 
see occurring more and more the thin definition is undermined and the rule of law 
breaks down.  
 
We are seeing this happen over and over in internet law terms. In the Kim DotCom 
(Megaupload) case we see a case similar to the O’Dwyer case but with greater 
publicity and higher stakes. The case which has now been on-going for four years 
saw an extradition request made in the New Zealand courts by the US Federal 
Government on grounds of racketeering, money laundering and criminal 
copyright infringement. The racketeering and money laundering charges stem 
from the alleged $175 million dollars generated by DotCom’s Megaupload site 
from criminal copyright infringement. A series of cases have challenged the search 
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and arrest warrants issued, the seizure of property and only recently has the 
extradition case begun.53  Again the question of the relevance of the United States 
as a forum for this case is questionable. DotCom lives in New Zealand and the 
company is registered in Hong Kong. Megaupload would though lease server 
space and according to the extradition request some of the alleged pirated content 
was hosted in the US on leased servers in Ashburn, Virginia, which gave US 
authorities jurisdiction. This though was only a small part of the companies 
operation and although this clearly gave the US Federal authorities jurisdiction 
over that content, it is not the case this gives them jurisdiction over the entire 
global operation of the company. Surely that is better reserved to either New 
Zealand or Hong Kong? More recently the European Union has applied domestic 
EU law in an extraterritorial way which has attracted a lot of commentary, 
attention and even ire from the United States. In the case of Google Spain SL v 
AEPD,54 the Court of Justice ruled the Google (and other similar Data Controllers) 
had to remove links to content relating to EU data subjects under Article 12(b) of 
the Data Protection Directive 55  which provides that ‘Member States are to 
guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller, as 
appropriate, the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which 
does not comply with the provisions of Directive.’  Although this is technically only 
of domestic effect, in that it only applies to those branches of the data controllers 
established in the EU, more recent decisions of domestic regulators are pushing 
this envelope with the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés 
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(CNIL) in France ordering Google to apply the so-called right to be forgotten 
principles not only to the company’s European domains such as google.co.uk or 
google.fr, but to the their global domain google.com.56 More recently the case of 
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner57 has had a more immediate direct effect. 
German Student Maximillian Schrems challenged the safe harbour agreement58 
agreed between the European Commission and the US Department of Commerce 
which allowed safe exportation of the data of EU citizens to the United States in 
compliance with Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive. He argued that data 
transfers from the EU to the United States by companies such as Facebook where 
such data could be accessed by national security agencies through programmes 
revealed by Edward Snowden such as PRISM demonstrated that the safe harbour 
could not adequately meet the principles set out in Article 25. The European Court 
of Justice agreed and finding that the protections afforded by the safe harbour 
were insufficient to provide protection to EU data subjects ruled the safe harbour 
agreement invalid. The result of this was to render illegal almost all data transfers 
from the EU to the US, a situation which has led to great concern from technology 
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companies59 and the White House60 and moves to negotiate a new safe harbour 
framework which is complaint with Data Protection Laws.61  
 
These decisions all points to a fundamental flaw in the rule of law in the online 
environment. Online global is local and the application of domestic laws in a 
domestic environment can have a global impact as seen in the Google Spain and 
Schrems cases. Equally online local is global and the impacts of local activities can 
attract global attention as seen in the Afsar, O’Dwyer and DotCom cases. The rule 
of law is replaced by a rule of laws which at points overlap with and conflict with 
each other undermining the basic principles of the rule of law. The problem is the 
result of conflicting attempts to apply both the internal and external views of 
online content and activity.  
Jurisprudence  
Does our other rabbit hole lead, as I argued, to the same conclusion? Very bravely 
I’m going to attempt what I believe to be a foolhardy exercise. Ask whether or not 
the preceding analysis undermines Hart’s Rule of Recognition on an individual 
state level? As we know the rule of recognition is a central part of Hart’s Concept 
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of Law.62 It is the fundamental rule by which all other rules are identified and 
understood. According to Hart, a legal system is primitive if it consists of just a 
series of primary rules that assign duties and obligations to the citizenry. This is 
because a society that issues only primary rules suffers from several deficiencies. 
To make up for those deficiencies, the society must issue secondary rules. These 
are of three types: rules of change, which allow primary rules to be extinguished 
or modified; rules of adjudication, which empower individuals to determine 
whether a primary rule has been broken; and, most importantly, the rule of 
recognition, which serves as an authoritative acknowledgment that the primary 
rules are the proper way of doing things. A legal system that contains these three 
types of secondary rules is, in Hart’s view, fully developed. 63  In a gross 
simplification of Hart’s position a rule or order becomes a law when it is 
recognized as such by the relevant officers of society. Of course the rule is much 
more sophisticated than this and learning to recognize laws (as opposed to other 
forms of rules) is complexified by the nature of modern complex legal systems. In 
modern systems with multiple sources of law, rules of recognition can be quite 
complex and require a hierarchy where some types rules overrule others. But, by 
far the most important function of the rule of recognition is that it allows us to 
determine the validity of a rule. Validity is what allows us to determine which rules 
should be considered laws, and therefore, which rules should create obligations 
for citizens with an internal perspective to the law. According to Hart, validity is 
not determined by whether a rule is obeyed, its morality, or its efficiency, but by 
whether it fits the criteria set forth by the rule of recognition. In more complex 
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legal systems we may have to trace the origin of a rule back a few steps to the 
source of its authority.64 In the context of Hart’s definition of validity (whether the 
law is derived from a source and in a manner approved by other rules) it simply 
does not make sense to ask about the validity of the rule of recognition in its 
supreme form. Once we have reached the rule of recognition, there is no higher 
level of rules to provide us with the criteria with which to judge its validity.  
 
What does this mean for our examples? One approach is to take the external view 
and to say that the rule is functioning perfectly well. Yasir Afsar was not extradited 
(in accordance with UK and Private Internal Law), Kim DotCom fights his day in 
court and Richard O’Dwyer reached a settlement (albeit one that cost him 
£20,000). Google may choose not to comply with the ruling of CNIL at which point 
should CNIL seek enforcement of the order it will become a question for the 
French, EU and potentially US courts in a manner not dissimilar to the classic 
Yahoo! France case of 2000. 65Finally the European Commission and the United 
States Federal Government negotiate a new Safe Harbour with (hopefully) none 
of the shortcomings of the original. At each turn the participants in the legal 
system were dealt with in accordance with the law, the law as recognized by the 
participants in that system (themselves included). But on an internal level Richard 
O’Dwyer was regulated in his actions by a law alien to the English and Welsh legal 
system (admittedly with the compliance of the courts – I hold my hand up here 
this is a weak argument). We in the UK would not recognize the US Laws as valid 
                                                        
64 Ibid 80-82. 
65 UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc. & Yahoo! France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de 
Paris, May 22, 2000. 
within this jurisdiction so does this fail Hart’s rule of recognition? Perhaps to 
borrow from another line of inquiry we are looking for Judge Hercules to protect 
us but instead we have to make do with Judge Achilles who seeks refuge in the rule 
of adjudication in determining the question of validity of external laws. This is 
because when viewed from Kerr’s internal perspective the question is 
overwhelming and the only practical approach is therefore to rely on procedural 
rules and institutional values.  
 
I believe that although we can rationalize the application of laws external to our 
jurisdiction in these internal internet cases through institutional value, doing so 
fails to acknowledge the elephant in the room (we have gone from Rabbits to 
Elephants) which is that Hart’s rule of recognition expects commonality of 
experience, culture and political values; similarly Dworkin’s Judge Hercules is 
someone who attains this role through common values, experience and culture, 
surely Dworkin does not expect Judge Hercules to be able to interpret English Law, 
US Federal and State Law and Burundian Law equally?  More so than positivists, 
natural lawyers such as Fuller require commonality of experience, culture and 
society in asking the question – what is moral? Although some things may appear 
easy: murder, rape and theft are always immoral – is blasphemy always immoral? 
What about standards of taste and decency? Once one internalizes the concept of 
‘going to’ or ‘socializing’ in the network our traditional legal foundations are under 
challenge and as international legal institutions and orders draw authority from 
the sovereign states which construct them so too do orders of international public 
and private law. I believe (in a less clear cut way) this rabbit hole leads to the same 
Wonderland. We have rules, laws even, for online actions, we can interpret how 
the law applies to these actions but we need urgently to address the key question 
– are they legitimate.   
Conclusion 
I promised a map of where we could go to identify a rule of law for the internet. 
I’m afraid this chapter falls somewhat short of that. I can though tell you where 
the map is to be found. It is in Orin Kerr’s divide between the internal and the 
external view of the network. For as long as lawmakers, courts and other 
adjudicatory bodies attempt to use both perspectives we will never have an 
effective rule of law for the internet. Too often authorities cherry pick whichever 
view they want to fit the situation they have before them so as Kerr notes when 
the US legal system allows prosecutors to choose to enforce either the external 
view (as in United States v. Kammersell 66  (bomb threat interstate)) and the 
internal view (as in United States v. Thomas67 (obscenity distribution)) depending 
upon which is better for their case we can never have an effective rule of law for 
the internet. This is true on the micro level and truer on the macro 
(interjurisdictional) level. Hence I have my map, as now do you. We now just need 
to see where the road takes us.  
 
                                                        
66 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999). 
67 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). 
